The framework of conceptual realism provides a logically ideal language within which to reconstruct the medieval terminist logic of the 14th century. The terminist notion of a concept, which shifted from Ockham's early view of a concept as an intentio nal object (the fictum theory), to his later view of a concept as a mental act (the intellectio theory), is reconstructed in this framework in terms of the idea of concepts as unsaturated cognitive structures. Intentional obects (ficta ) are not rejected but are reconstructed as the objectified intensional contents of concepts. Their reconstruction as intensional objects is an essential part of the theory of predication of conceptual realism. It is by means of this theory that we ar e able to explain how the identity theory of the copula, which was basic to terminist logic, applies to categorical propositions. Reference in conceptual realism is not the same as supposition in terminist logic. Nevertheless, the various "modes" of per sonal supposition of terminist logic can be explained and justified in terms of this conceptualist theory of reference.
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